Drafts and abstracts for my recent publications, articles under review, and works in progress can be found below. Feel free to contact me for drafts at email@example.com. I also appreciate comments!
Social Identity, Indexicality, and the Appropriation of Slurs (2017, Croatian Journal of Philosophy)
Abstract: Slurs are expressions that can be used to demean and dehumanize targets based on their membership in racial, ethnic, religious, gender, or sexual orientation groups. Almost all treatments of slurs posit that they have derogatory content of some sort. Such views—which I call content-based—must explain why in cases of appropriation slurs fail to express their standard derogatory contents. A popular strategy is to take appropriated slurs to be ambiguous; they have both a derogatory content and a positive appropriated content. However, if appropriated slurs are ambiguous, why can only members in the target group use them to express a non-offensive/positive meaning? Here, I develop and motivate an answer that could be adopted by any content-based theorist. I argue that appropriated contents of slurs include a plural first-person pronoun. I show how the semantics of pronouns like ‘we’ can be put to use to explain why only some can use a slur to express its appropriated content. Moreover, I argue that the picture I develop is motivated by the process of appropriation and helps to explain how it achieves its aims of promoting group solidarity and positive group identity.
Plural and Collective Noun Phrases (2017, Routledge Handbook on Collective Intentionality)
This chapter examines the semantic behavior and treatments of plural terms and collective noun phrases. The chapter begins with a discussion of kinds of plural and collective nouns and data a semantic treatment must capture. I set out major treatments of plural expressions--focusing on the differences between so-called Singularist and Pluralist treatments. I offer arguments that have been given to favor each. Finally I argue that semantic data involving collective nouns should be captured by a semantics that posits a polysemy between a group-as-one and group-as-may meaning.
Can Semantics Guide Ontology? (2016, Australasian Journal of Philosophy)
Abstract: Since the linguistic turn, many have taken semantics to guide ontology. Here, I argue that semantics can, at best, serve as a partial guide to ontological commitment. If semantics were to be our guide, semantic data and semantic treatments would need to be taken seriously. Through an examination of plurals and their treatments, I argue that there can be multiple equally semantically adequate treatments of a natural language theory. Further, such treatments can attribute different ontological commitments to a theory. Given this I argue that semantics can fail to deliver determinate ontological commitments and determinate answers to ontological questions more generally.
The Metaphysics of Social Groups (2015, Philosophy Compass)
Abstract: Social groups, including racial and gender groups and teams and committees, seem to play an important role in our world. This article examines key metaphysical questions regarding groups. I examine answers to the question “Do groups exist?” I argue that worries about puzzles of composition, motivations to accept methodological individualism and a rejection of Racialism support a negative answer to the question. An affirmative answer is supported by arguments that groups are efficacious, indispensible to our best theories and accepted given common sense. Then, I turn to an examination of the features of social groups. I argue that social groups can be divided into (at least) two sorts. Groups of Type 1 are organized social groups like courts and clubs. Groups of Type 2 are groups like Blacks, women, and lesbians. While groups of both sorts have some features in common, they also have marked differences in features. Finally, I turn to views of the nature of social groups. I argue that the difference in features provides evidence that social groups do not have a uniform nature. Teams and committees are structured wholes, while race and gender groups are social kinds.
What Are Groups? (2013, Philosophical Studies)
Abstract: In this paper I argue for a view of things like teams, committees and courts, which I call groups. I begin by examining the features all groups seem to have in common. I formulate a list of six criteria that any adequate theory of groups must capture. I then examine four of the most prominent views of groups currently on offer—that groups are fusions, aggregates, non-singular pluralities and sets. I argue that each fails to capture one or more of the criteria. Last, I develop the view that groups are realized structures. Such a view has two components. First, groups are entities with structure. Second, groups are concreta, so they exist only when a group structure is realized. I show how the view captures the six criteria while offering a substantive answer to the question, “What are groups?”
Works in Progress
Minimal Cooperation and Group Roles (commissioned for Springer volume Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency, edited by A. Fiebich)
Abstract: Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that members of organized groups can be minimally cooperative in virtue of playing roles in an organizational structure and having a common goal. The minimal form of cooperation I argue for is not grounded in collective intentions involving symmetric mental states, special collective intentional modes, or joint commitments. More generally, I show how considering minimal cooperation in the context of organized groups provides an opportunity to reevaluate the extent to which the social world and social phenomena depend on internalist mental factors (e.g., intentions, beliefs) and externalist non-mental factors (e.g., documents, laws, job descriptions). The view of minimal cooperation among members of organized groups I offer provides support for an externalist rather than internalist theory of at least one social phenomenon.
Group Nouns are Polysemous
Abstract: Predicates can apply to collective nouns, expressions like team, committee and court, in multiple ways. It has been noticed that collective nouns, like plural expressions, allow for distributive and collective predication. I argue that they also allow for a distinct sort of predication that takes a group-as-one as argument. I argue that the data is best explained by the view that collective nouns are polysemous rather than ambiguous. I then turn to a metaphysics of groups that will be employed by my semantics. I argue that groups-as-one are structured wholes––material entities that include a structural-functional element that features in their identity conditions. The identity conditions of groups-as-many, in contrast, rely only on material parts. Finally I sketch a semantic theory that accounts for the variety of predication of collective nouns and can handle some worrying cases involving entailment.
No "Easy" Answers to Identity Questions (with Vera Flocke, under review)
Abstract: Easy Ontologists, most notably Thomasson (2015), argue that ontological existence questions are in important respects trivial. They think that we can answer these questions by using our ordinary conceptual skills, perhaps together with some empirical investigations or pragmatic decisions. Ontology thus is “easy”, requiring no distinctively metaphysical investigation. This paper raises a two-stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first argue that ontological questions concerning which things exist are inextricably bound up with questions concerning the identity of and differences between kinds of things. We then argue that identity questions cannot be answered using only the resources available to Easy Ontologists. The reason is that identity is a first-order relation, and, unlike existence, is not plausibly construed as a second-order property. For this reason It is not in general possible to determine whether identities hold on purely conceptual grounds. We examine several ways in which an Easy Ontologist might try to get around this problem, and find them all wanting. Easy Ontology hence does not constitute a comprehensive ontological methodology. Even if ontological existence questions are trivial, there is still an important range of ontological questions whose answers require genuinely metaphysical inquiry.
Social Structures and the Ontology of Social Groups (under review)
Abstract: I develop and argue for an ontology of social groups centered around social structures (i.e., networks of relations that are constitutively dependent on social factors). The view delivers a picture that encompasses a wide range of social groups, while maintaining important metaphysical and normative distinctions between groups of different kinds (e.g., teams and committees, racial groups and gender groups). Further, I show how a social ontology based on social structures explains why not every arbitrary collection of people is a social group.
Social Creationism and Social Groups
Abstract: Social groups seem to be things that are dependent on us. Given this, it might seem that Social Creationism—the view that social practices, interactions, intentions and beliefs can create objects—holds for social groups. Here I argue that not all social groups are created equally. In particular I examine two categories of social groups—Feature Groups (e.g., racial and gender groups) and Organized Group (e.g., teams and committees). I argue that Feature and Organized Groups have distinct natures and creation conditions. Feature Groups are social kinds. While they depend on socially constructed properties, whether the groups themselves are created depends on one’s view of kinds. Even if they are created, however, it is in a “cheap” and easy way that follows from ascribing properties to already existent individuals. I argue that Organized Groups are structured wholes. Further, I argue that they are entities that are socially created in a robust sense. We are able to socially create, but not all social objects are socially created.
Groups––A Semantic and Metaphysical Examination
Short Dissertation Abstract: This manuscript is focused on the extent to which semantics can guide metaphysics. I argue that, at best, semantics can serve as a partial guide to metaphysics. Sometimes there will be indeterminate answers to questions of the form 'Does theory T carry a commitment to Fs?' Further, semantics will never answer questions regarding the nature of Fs.
In it I apply this methodology to plurals (e.g., 'the girls,' 'Tom, Luke and George') and collective nouns (e.g., 'the team,' 'a committee'). I argue that plurals are indeterminately committed to sums (or other singular entities) while collective nouns are determinately committed to groups. The semantics of collective nouns delivers the minimal verdict that groups exist, but says nothing about their nature. I also undertake an examination of the metaphysics of groups which goes beyond semantics to offer a substantive view of the metaphysics of groups.